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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

TECH-FLUID SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

:
:
:

Cert. No.
Category No. 13

GAVILAN OPERATING INCORPORATED, :
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP.,
et al.
:
Defendants/Respondents. :

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did

the

Court of Appeals err when it limited this

Court's holding in Mollerup v. Storage
569

P.2d

1122

(Utah

1977)

requiring

Rule 69 and held that substantial
necessary

to

redeem

pursuant

Systems,

International,

strict compliance with

compliance

is

all

that

is

to Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure?
II.
the

assignee

Did the Court of Appeals
of

when

it

held

that

a redemption need only post the sale price to

redeem from a lien foreclosure
lien?

err

instead

of

paying

the

entire

OPINION ISSUED BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The

opinion

of

the Utah Court of Appeals is contained

in 128 Utah Adv.Rep. 40.
JURISDICTION
The Court
affirming
1990.
to

the

of

Appeals

judgment

of

filed
the

its

trial

decision
court

This Court has jurisdiction over this

§78-2-2 (3) (a)

which

provides

for

and

order

on February 16,

petition

appellate

pursuant

jurisdiction

over "a judgment of the Court of Appeals."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Appellant

corporation

in

the

Tech-Fluid

appeal)

the

is

a

(R.l)

Paiute Oil and Walker Energy (not

were

Inc.

business of providing oil well services to

wells in the eastern Utah area.
2.

Services,

owner

parties

to

this

of mineral interests in the following

described real property: (R.l)
Section 13, Township 3 South, Range 5
FNL
932
FEL,
Duchesne
County,
Paiute-Walker U3-ND-1.
3.

On

August

West,
known

820
as

16, 1984, Tech-Fluid provided services,

equipment and labor to the

Paiute

well

pursuant

to

contract

between Tech-Fluid and Paiute Oil.
4.
$69,708.30.

Tech-Fluid
Paiute did

provided
not

pay

material
for

any

and
of

labor

the

labor or services rendered to it by Tech-Fluid. (R.2)
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worth

materials,

5.

Tech-Fluid

filed

an

the Duchesne County Recorder's

Amended

Office

on

Notice of Lien with
November

30, 1984.

(R.2)
6.

On

January

to foreclose its
Energy,

24, 1984, Tech-Fluid filed a complaint

lien.

Duchesne

Paiute

County,

Oil,

and

Gulf

Sam
Oil

Oil,

Inc., Walker

Corp.

were named as

defendants. (R.l-6)
7.

On

Corporation
Chapter 11

December

filed
of

Bankruptcy

the

Court

a

18,

1985, Paiute

voluntary

Bankruptcy
for

the

Oil

reorganization
Code

Mining

petition under

with

the

of

Utah.

District

&

United
All

States
actions

against Paiute were stayed by the filing of that Petition.
8.
that

the

On February 25, 1986,
answers

of

the

District

of

ordered

defendants Sam Oil, Inc., Walker Energy,

Chevron USA, Inc. and Duchesne County be
judgment

Court

foreclosure

stricken

and

of Tech-Fluid. (R.423-424)

granted
A copy of

the Court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
9.
the

Tech-Fluid obtained an order

automatic

granting

relief

from

say on May 18, 1987 as to Paiute Oil. (R.427) A

copy of the Court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit WB."
10.
authorizing

On May

20, 1987, Tech-Fluid

foreclosure

and

a

public

obtained

sale

an

pursuant

provisions of the Mechanic Lien Foreclosure Act. (R.426)

-3-

order
to the

11.
sheriff's

Tech-Fluid
sale

and

subsequently

an

execution

together with interest. (R.435)

filed

a

notice

of

in the amount of $86,943.64

The property was sold

July

2,

through

a

1987 to Tech-Fluid for $4000. (R.443-444)
12.
director

On

December

Walter

redemption
(R.462)

Davidson,

rights
A

31, 1987, Paiute

copy

to
of

purportedly

Wind
the

River

assignment

Oil,

assigned

Paiute Oil's

Resources
is

Corporation.

attached

hereto

as

Exhibit "C."
13.

The

assignment

has been purportedly acknowledged

by an unidentified notary without a seal being apparent
face of the copy.
14.
the

On

following

on

the

Exhibit "C" (R.462)
January

1,

1988, Wind River Resources served

documents

on

an

on

duty

dispatcher

at

the

Duchesne County Sheriff's Office:
Exhibit "D" - Cashier's check in the sum of $4310.00
Exhibit "E" - Assignment of Rights of Redemption
Exhibit "F" - Notice of Redemption
Exhibit "G" - Sheriff's Redemption Certificate
15.
order

to

On January 8, 1988, plaintiff filed

a

motion

for

show cause why the Sheriff should not issue a deed to

Tech-Fluid based upon an invalid redemption. (R.452-53)

-4-

16.
heard

on

The court issued an

January

190, 1988

order

at

to

1:30

show

cause

to

be

in the Duchesne County

Courthouse. (R.454-55)
17.
plaintiff's

The court held a hearing on
order

to

show

January

19#

1988

on

cause. Counsel for Tech-Fluid and

Wind River argued the case to

the

court

and

were

given

ten

days to submit briefs. (R.456)
18.

The

ruling that the
could

not

court

issued

assignment

be

executed

its Ruling on February 5, 1988

was

upon

valid,
and

rights

Wind

redemption under Rule 69 because it had
with

Rule

69.

of

redemption

River was entitled to
substantially

complied

Finally, the court ordered that Tech-Fluid had

no further interest in the well. (R.569-570)
19.
and

On February 10,

accompanying

objecting

to

1988

memorandum

the

amount

of

of

Tech-Fluid

filed

a

motion

law pursuant to Rule 69(f)(3)

money

posted

by

Wind

River.

Tech-Fluid requested a hearing on its motion. (R.581-85)
20.

On

February

Alter or Amend the
whether

plaintiff's

ruling

11, 1988 plaintiff filed a Motion to
(R.572-73)

raising

the

issues

of

lien is extinguished and whether the Court

misapplied this Court's holding

in

J.A.

Mollerup

v.

Storage

Systems International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). (R.572-80)
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21.

Wind

River

filed responses to plaintiff's motion

and filed a motion for sanctions. (R.586-599)
22.
sanctions

Plaintiff responded
(R.600-602)

plaintiff's

other

to

Wind

River's

motion

for

and replied to Wind River's responses to

motions.

(R.603-608)

Plaintiff

filed

a

request for ruling on all motions before the Court. (R.609-610)
23.

On

February

29, 1988 the court issued its Ruling

denying all post hearing motions. (R.611)
24.

The court signed its Conclusions of Law

and

Order

on February 29, 1988. (R.612-617)
25.

Plaintiff

filed

a

Notice

to

filing

of Appeal on March 3,

1988. (R.619-620)
26.
Appeal,

Subsequent

defendant

Wind

River

plaintiff's

Resources

Notice

of

sold its interest to

Gavilan Operating Incorporated.
27.

On February 16, 1990, the Court

its opinion.

of

Appeals

filed

The opinion can be found at 128 Utah Adv.Rep. 40.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The

Court

of

Appeals

decision

previous decision of this Court when it
substantially
Rule

69,

Utah

complied

with

the

is in conflict with a
held

procedural

Rules of Civil Procedure.

that

Wind

River ^

requirements

The Court of Appeals

erred when it held that Wind River substantially complied with
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ofm

the provisions of Rule 69.
basis

"Substantial compliance"

is

not

a

for

the

court granting relief to Wind River absent some

reason for

the

court

to

proceed

in

Mollerup

v.

Storage

Systems

decision

in

P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977) ,
69.

Moreover,

Loosley,
of this
conduct

551

this

mandates
Court's

equity.

strict

This

Court's

International, 569

compliance

with

in

States

decision

United

Rule
v.

P.2d 506 (Utah 1976) is inapplicable to the facts

case

because

justifying

Tech-Fluid
equitable

engaged
relief.

in

no

inequitable

Because

Wind

failed to strictly comply with Rule 69, the redemption

River

is

void

and this Court should grant this petition.
The

Court

River posted
redeem,

Wind

the

lien

property

amount

Rule
in

69(f)(3)

sale,

redeem.

order

provides

then

for

Tech-Fluid's

only

the

the

to

of

lien

is

the

still

in

amount
tact

Redemption

the
In
of
and
only

sale and restored the debtor to its property as if

there had been no sale.
by

order

payment

post

Tech-Fluid may once again foreclose its lien.
stopped

In

to redeem under a lien foreclosure.

the alternative, if Wind River need
the

to

River must post the entire amount due on the lien

with interest.
entire

of Appeals also erred when it held that Wind

lien.

The

The property

Court

should

is

therefore

grant

this

encumbered

petition

certiorari to review and clarify this important rule of law.
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for

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WIND
FAILURE
TO
U.R.CIV.P.

RIVER RESOURCES' REDEMPTION WAS
INVALID
FOR
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 69(f),

One of the central
Wind

River

Resources

issues

complied

of

this

Court

69(f)(2)

conflict

lien

foreclosure

in

with

procedural

order to redeem.

this

Court's

ruling

Systems, International, 569 P.2d 1122
Court

whether

sale.

of Appeals held that a party seeking redemption need

only substantially comply with the
Rule

was

with Rule 69(f)(2), U.R.Civ.P.

when it purportedly redeemed under the
The

case

held

"the

right

Utah

Rules

of

The Court's decision is in
in

Mollerup

(Utah

1977)

v.

Storage

where

this

of redemption has long been recognized

as a substantive right to be exercised
statutory terms."

requirements

in

strict

accord

with

Ic[. at 1124
of

Civil Procedure, Rule 69(f) governs the

procedural requirements for a valid redemption.

Rule

69(f)(2)

provides:
At the time of redemption the person seeking the
same may make payment of the amount required to
the
person from whom the property is being
redeemed, or for him to the officer who make the
sale or his successor in office. At the same
time the redemptioner must
produce
to
the
officer or person from whom he seeks to redeem,
and serve with his notice to the officer:
(Emphasis added)
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(1)

a certified copy of the docket of the
judgment under which he claims the right
to redeem;

(2)

an
assignment, properly acknowledged
proved where the same is necessary
establish his claim;

(3)

an
affidavit
by himself or his
showing the amount due on the lien.

When Wind River filed for redemption it
dispatcher

at

the

Duchesne

County

agent

served

Sheriff's

or
to

upon

Office

a
the

following documents:
1)

A copy of an Assignment of Rights (Exhibit E ) ;

2)

A Notice of Redemption (Exhibit $\) :

3)

Sheriff's Certificate

4)

A cashier's check in the sum of $4310 (Exhibit D ) .

of

Redemption

(Exhibit G ) ;

and

Wind River filed no other documents.
Wind
order

of

evidencing

River

failed

foreclosure.
the

to

file

Moreover,

assignment

notary seal or signature.

does

a

certified

the
not

copy of the

(original

supply

Finally, Wind River

a

document

recognizable

failed

to

file

an affidavit showing the amount due on the lien.
The

Court

of

Appeals

noted these deficiencies in its

opinion as follows:
Wind River could have complied more fully
several
respects.
Although
there
was
judgment docketed, Wind River could have

-9-

in
no

submitted a copy of the court order directing
sale of the well. Moreover, there are no facts
in the record to suggest an excuse for the
inadequate
notarization
of
the
assignment.
Finally, Wind River would surely have submitted
an affidavit stating the alleged amount due on
the lien.
Id. 128 Utah Adv.Rep. at 44 n.7
Yet

despite

the

above

deficiencies,

that Wind River has substantially complied
and

approved

the

substantial

with

compliance

the

Court held

Rule

69(f)(2)

rule. J^d. 128 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 43
The Court of Appeals
because

substantial

stated is
Mollerup

the
v.

erred

compliance

law

regarding

in

authorizing

redemption

is not the standard this Court
compliance

with

Rule

69.

In

Storage Systems International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah

1977), this Court held that a

redemptor

must

strictly

comply

with the requirements of the statute.
In

Mollerup,

the

trial

court

redemption beyond the six month period
to

two

ex

parte

extended the period of
of

redemption

pursuant

orders submitted by the redemptor under Rule

69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Reversing, the Court held:

The right of redemption has long been recognized
as a substantive right to be exercised in strict
accord with statutory terms.
It is not
an
equitable right cured or regulated by principles
of equity but, rather, is a creature of statute
and depends entirely upon the provisions of the
statute creating the right.
Id. 569 P.2d at 1124 (Emphasis added)
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Wind
constitute

River's
strict

efforts

to

compliance

redeem

clearly

do

not

with the terms of the statute as

mandated by this Court's decision in Mollerup,
The Court of Appeals found that
with

Rule

69

Assuming

is

arguendo

substantial

sufficient
that

the

documents

filed

because

statute.

The Court of Appeals relied upon this

United

support

States

their

v.

were

not

Loosley,

conclusion

constitute

redemption still is invalid under

Mollerup

in

they

compliance

to establish a valid redemption.

the

compliance,

substantial

in

551

that

strict

P.2d

compliance
Court

506

substantial

with

decision

(Utah 1976) to
compliance

is

sufficient to justify redemption.
Loosley

involved

similar

deficiencies

in this case with the exception that
is

also

this

between

creditor-purchaser

this
knew

case
of

and

the

failed to notify the redemptor.
that

the

deficiencies

Loosley' s

the

expiration

is

deficiencies

The

were

court

in

sitting

insufficient

redemption because the creditor-purchaser knew
to

case

Tech-Fluid

challenging the validity of the assignment.

difference

held

in

as are present

24

The chief
that

the

Loosley and
in

equity

to defeat the
hours

prior

of the redemption period of the redemptor's

technical deficiencies in the redemption.

The

creditor

to inform the redemptors even after a phone call by the

-11-

failed

redemptor

asking

redemption, _Id. at
Court

held

grant

the

that

if

there

507.
the

were

Under

trial

redemption

the

the

deficiencies

facts

court,

despite

misconduct and waiver on the

any

of

sitting

in

the

Loosley,

the

in equity, could

deficiencies

part

of

the

case

are

due

to

the

creditor-mortgagee.

Id. at 508.
The
from

facts

Loosley

in

of

this

that

Tech-Fluid

clearly distinguishable

has

no

knowledge

redemption until after the period to redeem had
Court's

decision

in

Mollerup

specifically

expired.

United

accident,
States

Mollerup,

569

v.

mistake

or

Loosley,

in

Utah,

69(f).

relief

for

551

P.2d

506

(1976)."

P.2d at 1124. There are simply no facts in this

equity

as

redemption

be

to

grant

Wind

River

there was no fraud, accident, mistake or

waiver on the part of Tech-Fluid.
River's

This

waiver as was found to exist in

case to move the conscience of the court
relief

the

limits Loosley to

instances where a court sitting in equity may grant
"fraud,

of

denied

Mollerup mandates

that

Wind

for failure to comply with Rule

To allow redemption under these facts

will

render

the

requirements of Rule 69 advisory.
Moreover,

absent

inequitable

the creditor, substantial compliance

conduct
is

a

bad

on

the part of

rule

and

lead to further litigation over what constitutes substantial

-12-

may

compliance.

This

compliance

in

Court

recent

721

was

verification.
the

that case.
v.

Cascade

name

furnished

and

This Court held

doctrine

of

Corp.,

660

631

the

the
the

person

notice

lien

proper

to

whom

lacked

irivalid

the

proper

refusing

to

substantial compliance to the facts of

IcL at 722-723.

Hansen,

of

See also, First

P.2d

919

(Utah

verification

of

Security

Mortgage

1981) (where this Court

rejected plaintiff's substantial compliance
that

substantial

(Utah 1983), the lien claimant filed a notice of lien

material

Co.

upon

In Graff v. Boise

that failed to contain the

apply

frowned

cases construing the notice requirements

of Utah's lien statute.
P.2d

has

argument

and

held

the lien notice was a mandatory

condition precedent to creation of a valid lien.)
Although substantial compliance has
law

to

place

in

the

prevent creditors from engaging in inequitable conduct,

it simply does not apply
Court

its

should

to

the

facts

of

this

case.

This

grant the Petition for Certiorari and reverse the

decision of the Court of Appeals

because

the

decision

is

in

conflict with previous decisions of this Court.
POINT II
DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
ASSIGNEE OF A REDEMPTION NEED ONLY POST THE SALE PRICE TO
REDEEM FROM A LIEN FORECLOSURE INSTEAD OF PAYING THE ENTIRE
LIEN?
As previously indicated, Tech-Fluid
sale.

bid

$4000

at

Wind River Resources posted $4310 as redemption on the

-13-

the

well.

This

is

not

the

proper

pursuant to Rule 69(f)(3).

amount

in

order

Wind River must post the

to redeem
amount

of

the lien with interest.
Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
The property may be redeemed from the purchaser
within six months after the sale on paying the
amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon .
and, if the purchaser is also a creditor
having a lien prior to that of the
person
seeking
redemption,
other than the judgment
under which said purchase was made, the amount
of such lien with interest. (Emphasis added)
"Purchaser"

means

Tech-Fluid.

In

order

redeem, Wind River needed to pose the amount of

to properly

the

lien

with

the

underlined

interest.
The

Court

of

Appeals

held

provision means that an assignee of
only

post

the

sale

price

the lien.

This

conclusion

recognize

the

specific

provides:
same

as

are

judgment

debtor

need

to satisfy the debt and extinguish
is

flawed

language

"If the judgment debtor

payments

the

that

required

because

in

Rule

redeems
to

he

effect

it

fails

69(f)(5)
must

which

make

redemption

to

the
by

a

creditor."
Other

courts

looking

at

the

issue have specifically

held that the entire amount of the debt must be
to redeem, not just the sale price.
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paid

in

The seminal case is

order

Collins

v,

Riggs,

81 U.S. 491, 20 L.Ed.2d 723 (1872), wherein

the Court held:
To redeem property which has been sold under a
mortgage for less than the mortgage debt, it is
not sufficient to tender the amount of
the
sale.
The whole mortgage debt must be tendered
or paid into court.
The party offering
to
redeem, proceeds upon the hypothesis that, as to
him, the mortgage has never been foreclosed it
is still in existence.
Therefore he can only
lift it by paying it. The money will be subject
to distribution between the mortgagee and the
purchaser, in equitable proportions, so as to
reimburse the latter his purchase money and pay
the former the balance of this debt.
Id. at 81 U.S. at 498, 20 L.Ed.2d at 724.
Numerous
regarding
National

the

courts
amount

Bank

of

have

adopted

necessary

Orlando

v.

for

Garuich

of

Sun

rule
First

R.G.G., 348 So.2d 621 (Fla App.
762,

766

(3rd

Cir.

v. Associates Financial Services Co., 435 So.2d

30 (Ala 1983) (when
amount

Collins

redemption.

1977); United States v. Brosnan, 264 F.2d
1959);

the

the

mortgagee

debt

is

buys

treated

at

foreclosure

sale

the

as the purchase price rather

than the amount bid.)
This rule was codified in
requires

the

28

U.S.C.

2410(d)(1)

which

United States to post the amount of the debt, not

just the sale price, if it wants to redeem property
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sold

under

Policy
rule.

reasons

support this Court adopting the Collins

The creditor takes security

Before

the

debtor

free and clear
should

be

of

should
the

be

for

of

the debt.

entitled to redeem the property

creditors

paid in full.

payment

lien,

the

underlying

debt

All parties would obtain exactly what

they were entitled to under their

contractual

rights

and

the

debtors property rights are protected.
The

alternative

by paying the sale
This

rule,

bid

would be to allow the debtor to redeem
price

but

not

810

In

Bennion

812.

lien.

v.

Amoss,

530

(Utah 1975), this Court held that a redemption by the

assignee of the judgment debtor "restores the
same

the

although more cumbersome, appears to be the current

rule of law regarding redemption.
P.2d

extinguish

condition
Rule

as

if

69(f)(5)

no

sale

provides

had
"if

effect of the sale is terminated

property

to

been attempted."
the

and

he

debtor
is

the

Ij3. at

redeems,

restored

to

the
his

estate."
Thus

a

redemption

terminates

leaving the property still encumbered by
Tech-Fluid

can

at

extinguished

effect of the sale

the

Tech-Fluid

lien.

any time notice up a new sale to obtain the^

payment of its lien.
was

the

by

Wind

River

argued

the

sale.

The

the
above

Tech-Fluid
quoted

language

however shows that it was restored by redemption "as if no
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lien

sale

had

taken

place."

The better rule of law would require

the debtor to post the entire amount of the
redeem

and

interpretation
petition

for

regarding

Tech-Fluid
of

urges

Rule

69.

this

This

lien

Court

Court

in

order

to

to

adopt

that

should

grant

the

certiorari to clarify this important point on law

interpretation

of

Rule

69, Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons
that

the

Court

grant

the

appellant

respectfully

requests

petition for writ of certiorari to

the Utah Court of Appeals.
DATED this 16th day of March, 1990.
McRAE & DeLA^D

HARRY H/ SOUVALL
Attotprey for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify
four

(4)

Utah

I mailed,

postage

prepaid,

true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition for

Writ of Certiorari to Clark
Bunnell,

that

Attorneys

for

B. Allred,

Respondent,

McKeachnie, Allred

363

East

84078 on this 16th day of March, 1990.

Harry w. Souvall
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Main, Vernal,

BOrnbi-l" A
ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217
McRAE & DeLAND
Attorneys for Plaintiff
209 East 100 North
Vernal, UT 84078
(801) 789-1666
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TECH-FLUID SERIVCES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
O R D E R
vs.
Civil No. 85-CV-13D
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP.,
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY
GROUP, CHEVRON U.S.A. INC.,
and DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body
politic,
Defendants.

This Court, having heretofore entered it's Order
February 10, 1986, that defendants Sam Oil, Inc., Walker Energy
Group, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. and Duchesne County, a body politic,
within 10 days file proof with this Court of any evidence of
ownership in that certain oil well and appurtenances thereto known
as 13ND-1 and no proof of ownership having been filed therein by
any of these defendants, IT IS ORDERED that their answers be
stricken and that a judgment of foreclosure issue in favor of
plaintiff as against said oil well.

FILED

7th DISTRICT COURT DUCHESNE
STATE OF UTAH

04

FEB 25 1986
>>-» L ^

R T W O H UAQCTT

ruA

This Court, having been advised that defendant
Paiute Oil & Mining Corp. is under the jurisdiction of the
United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah, plaintiff's
rights as between this defendant will not be adjudicated at
this time.
DATED this

fy/

day of February, 1986.
BY THE COURT::

RICHARD C. DAVINDSON
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy
of the foregoing to the following on this 1~'
Mr. Kent H. Murdock
Attorney for Defendant Chevron
P.O. Box 45383
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Dennis L. Draney
Attorney for Duchesne County
P.O. Box 206
Duchesne, UT 84021
Brent V. Manning
Attorney for Walker
50 South Main Street, #900
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Paul N. Cotro-Manes
Attorney for Paiute
311 South State, #280
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

042-i

day of February, 1986,

Mr. Roland F. Uresk
Attorney for Sam Oil
156 North 200 East
Roosevelt, UT 84066

04..;4*

E*h»bi+ ft
ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217
McRAE & DeLAND
Attorneys for Plaintiff
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: 789-1666
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TECH-FLUID SERVICES, INC.,
O R D E R

Plaintiff,

vs.
Civil No. 85-CV-13D

PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP.,
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY
GROUP, CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., and
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body politic,
Defendants.

A certified

copy

of

the Release

of Automatic

Stay

provisions of the U. S. Bankruptcy Act having been filed with
this Order

releasing

the automatic

stay provision as it may

apply to Paiute Oil & Mining Corp., IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
the Sheriff of Duchesne County post and conduct a public sale
as provided for by law in the Mechanic Lien Foreclosure Act.
DATED thi

day of May, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

ihOlSTRlCTCOURTDOCHESN

DENNIS L. DRANEY
District Court Judge

JJN4J 1937
H06EH K. MAtttT i, Vjlerk

Or^i

L. A. DEVER, #0875
McRAE & DeLAND
Attorneys for Tech-Fluid
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: 789-1666

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
In re:
PAIUTE OIL AND MINING
CORPORATION,

Bankruptcy No. 84C-02620
(Chapter 7)

Debtor.

ORDER GRANTING RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
AND ABANDONMENT
The motion of Tech-Fluids for relief
stay
filed

came

before

the

Court;

and

no

from

objections

automatic

having

been

to the motions; and after filing Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that

the

automatic

stay of Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy

Code is terminated as to Tech-Fluids, effective upon entry of
this Order.

The trustee is ordered to abandon the bankrupt's

interest in Well ND13-1.
DATED this

~7~

'"day May, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

A
Rule 5^0;,'r/ Des -nation
? Cierfc : - * ^ j to i.-u3r a copy
-de/ into fhv rcurfs Order 8ook.
tntry Into Order Book not necessary.

1

_

1ST
u&
^^li^r^^fc^^aop^d
c.

and T

°-;

;s a true and complete cop/ of a documen' ;.
file in the United States Bankruptcy Coc
for the District of Utah.
Dated: *AV i 8 88?
.,
Attest:
, y,

day.

— /

• /J. fat

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid,
a copy of the Order in the Seventh Judicial District Court
and a copy of the Certified Order Granting Relief From Automatic
Stay and Abandonment to the following on this _ ^ g y d a y
1987.
Ms. Harriet E. Styler
8 East Broadway, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Mr. Richard Johns
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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ASSIGNMENT OF REDEMPTION RIGHTS
Paiute Oil l^^jx^rfa^gfoyrgtion,
a Utah corporation,
sreby assigns and conveys^to Wind River Resources Corporation,
Utah corporation, all of Paiute1s right, title and interest
n the property described below, plus all of Paiute1s right to
edeem said property from the sale held on July 2, 1987
ursuan t to an execution issued in the case of Tech-Fluid
ervice s, Inc. vs. Paiute Oil & Mining Corp., Civil No.
5-CV-13D in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne
ounty, State of Utah. Wind River Resources Corporation is
ereby authorized to take any and all actions necessary to
edeem said property on its own behalf in the stead of Paiute
il & Mining Corporation.
The property to be redeemed is described as follows:
All operating and leasehold interest in
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1 Well located
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township
3 South, Range 5 Westfl^buchesne County,
Utah, together with all rights, privileges, franchise, easements, equipment,
machinery
or appliances
appurtenant
thereto.
EXECUTED the Zl^

day of

/W«*. Lu^

198T

PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORPORATION
By:

\Mfenk.

CAs

hfecAtP^

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss

On the
day of cJs^isy-K*-,
, 198]j^_, personally
whQ/ bein
appeared before me (J^ra^ ^ i 6 ^ ; ^ f "
9 bY m e d u l Y
sworn, did say
that he is ^fee A l^^C^Vbf^
of Paiute Oil &
Mining
Corporation,
and
that
this
instrument
was signed
in
behalf of Ksaid corporation by authority of its bylaws,
and said
acknowledged
to ~\me
that
said
corporation executed the

My/Commission Expires:

mm.

&t\\b& O

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.
Salt Lake City, Utah

mmmmimmmm
in

848452921
Office No. 0 5 c l a

••4,310.0c**

"DUCHESNE COUNTY SHERIFF #«

i 13-ND-l WELL
HA:

Datt 12/31/87

/WAtrySWife
Authorized Signature

• : o 2 5 a k o t . a a » : a««i«&?5&? a i * a u s 2 S 2 i

rtrwt Sccanly $mmk wf Uta*

ASSIGNMENT OF REDEMPTION RIGHTS
Paiute Oil & ^(^J^^^£9^3I£ t i o n ' a Utah corporation,
>reby assigns and conveys^to Wind River Resources Corporation,
Utah corporation, all of Paiute1s right, title and interest
\ the property described below, plus all of Paiute1s right to
»deem said property from the sale held on July 2, 1987
arsuant to an execution issued in the case of Tech-Fluid
grvices, Inc. vs. Paiute Oil & Mining Corp., Civil No.
5-CV-13D in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne
Dunty, State of Utah. Wind River Resources Corporation is
ereby authorized to take any and all actions necessary to
edeem said property on its own behalf in the stead of Paiute
il & Mining Corporation.
The property to be redeemed is described as follows
All operating and leasehold interest in
the Paiute-Walker #13~ND-1 Well located
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township
3 South, Range 5 WestT^jDuchesne County,
Utah, together with all rights, privileges, franchise, easements, equipment,
machinery
or appliances
appurtenant
thereto.
EXECUTED the %/** day of

/W>V, /i/^*

198T

PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORPORATION
By:

L hi ^kfa

CAs

\^lcAipK

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss
)

day
cJs)>st<f\-\ *-i
day of
of cj,)*sc*u
/ 198^ , personally
Uftpg.
fc^ib3>/^
who, being by me duly
h e i s <fefee A <^i*£~<iTofc_
of Paiute Oil «
Mining Corporation/ and that this instrument was signed in
behalf of .said corporation by authority of i t s bylaws, and said
acknowledged
to --\me
that
said
corporation executed the

On the 1st
appeared before me
sworn, did say, t h a t

My/Commission Expires;

mm.

txniQT YNOTICE OF REDEMPTION
TO:

The Sheriff of Duchesne County, State of Utah.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on this date, Wind River
Resources Corporation, a Utah corporation, redeemed the following property from your sale thereof to Tech-Fluid Services,
Inc. on July 2, 1987 pursuant to an execution on a judgment
rendered in the case of Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. vs. Paiute
Oil & Mining Corp., et al, Civil Case No. 85-CV-13D in the
Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, State of
Utah.
The certificate of sale shows a purchase price of
$4,000. This amount plus interest of $240 and posting costs of
$70, for a total of $4,310 is hereby tendered to you in
accordance with Rule 69(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The property redeemed is described as follows:
All operating and leasehold interest in
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1 Well located
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township
3 South, Range 5 West,^fDuchesne County,
Utah, together with all rights, privileges, franchise, easements, equipment,
machinery
or
appliances
appurtenant
thereto.
Wind River Resources Corporation claims the right to
redeem the above property on the basis that it has received an
assignment from the judgment debtor of the judgment debtor's
redemption rights so that Wind River Resources Corporation is
the successor in interest of the judgment debtor for purposes
of redemption in accordance with Rule 69(f)(1) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Attached hereto and incorporated by
reference is an assignment of said redemption rights from the
judgment debtor.

a

IN

WITNESS

WHEREOF,

this

Notice

is

executed

WIND RIVER RESOURCES CORPORATION

?&fcr>

3L

on

- 2 STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss
)

personally
i "who, bein<
appeared before me A T ^ N ^ V ^ ^ T E ' :
-E?L
m
g
by
me duly
sworn, did say, that he is the
PkF^(b'C/<JT~
of Wind River
Resources Corporation, and that the attached Notice of Redemption was signed in b^alfvpf said corporation by authority of
its bylaws, and said \ ^l\\M^^C\^^Cacknowledged to me
that said corporation executed the same.

A»
Notary Publi
It
Resadmg
at:
My Commission Expires:

'#f

—

t>nmT

^

SHERIFFS REDEMPTION CERTIFICATE
The undersigned/ acting on behalf of the Sheriff of
Duchesne County/ Utah/ hereby certifies that on this date I
"received from Wind River Resources Corporation, a Utah corporation, the sum of $4,310 in full redemption of the tract of land
and the property described below, from the sale thereof by the
Sheriff of Duchesne County, Utah to Tech-Fluid Services, Inc.
on July 2, 1987 pursuant to an execution issued on a judgment
in Civil Case No. 85-CV-13D in the Seventh Judicial District
Court of Duchesne County, State of Utah.
The property redeemed is described as follows:
All operating and leasehold interest in
the Paiute-Walker I13-ND-1 Well located
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township
3 South, Range 5 West^lbuchesne County,
Utah/ together with all rights/ privileges, franchise, easements/ equipment,
machinery
or appliances
appurtenant
thereto.
As support for and proof of its right to redeem, the
redemptioner produced an assignment of redemption rights from
the judgment debtor, Paiute Oil & Mining Corporation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this Certificate
at Duchesne, Utah on *~^\ ^ lKm
<
, 198B •

J

/

\r.> ivk v.-> - ^ ', jQJu/^i t-rvy^ fv^A jCu7T7> ^ W i!U

n

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE

ss.

On t h e J
day of (JuAU^y^vM
,, 198_£,
(\)
^
198_£, p e r s o n a l l y
a p p e a r e d b e f o r e me k^VTfAicc^ HfttttiSOO v^pe
v t p e " signer
signer o
of t h e above
i n s t r u m e n t , who duly acknowledged t o me t h a t he e x e c u t e d t h e
same.

Notary Publi
Residing a

t^fcftCm.Om

My Commission Expires
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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OPINION
(For Publication)

Tech-Fluid Services, Inc.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 890067-CA

v.
Gavilan Operating, Inc.,
Paiute Oil & Mining Corp.,
et al.,

FILED

Defendants and Respondents.

Seventh District, Duchesne County
The Honorable Dennis L. Draney
Attorneys:

FEB 1&1990
4oor*n
J of th« Court
ttarti fifcurt •< Appeals

Harry H. Souvall and Robert M. McRae, Vernal, for
Appellant
Clark B. Allred and Gayle F. McKeachnie, Vernal,
for Respondents

Before Judges Bullock,1 Jackson, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
Appellant Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. appeals from an
adverse ruling concerning the redemption of property it
purchased at a sheriff's sale. We affirm.
FACTS
Paiute Oil and Mining Corporation, the predecessor of
respondent Gavi Ian Operating, Inc., had an ownership interest
in an oil and g as well located in Duchesne County. Appellant
Tech-Fluid Serv ices, Inc. supplied services and materials to
the well for wh ich it was not paid. In November 1984, it filed
a mechanics' li en on the well claiming that $69,708 was owing.
In January 1985 , Tech-Fluid commenced an action to foreclose
its lien naming Paiute and several other entities as
defendants.
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (1989).

In December 1985/ Paiute filed a voluntary reorganization
petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee
was subsequently appointed. In February 1986, the state
district court entered a judgment of foreclosure as against all
of the defendants in the lien action except Paiute. Because of
the pending bankruptcy, the district court specifically
declined to adjudicate the claim as between Paiute and
Tech-Fluid.
In May 1987, Tech-Fluid obtained an order lifting the
automatic stay as it applied to the lien action and ordering
the trustee to abandon her interest in the well. Thereafter,
Tech-Fluid obtained an order from the district court directing
the sale of Paiute's interest in the well. No judgment of
foreclosure against Paiute was ever entered or docketed prior
to the court-ordered sale, a procedure which, while unorthodox,
was never objected to by any party. A sheriff's sale of the
well was held on July 2, 1987. Tech-Fluid was the only bidder
at the sale and purchased the property with a $4,000 credit
bid.
In the fall of 1987, Tech-Fluid discovered that Paiute
intended to assign its redemption right. Tech-Fluid demanded a
quitclaim deed, but Paiute refused. On December 14, 1987,
Tech-Fluid obtained from the county clerk a writ of execution
instructing the sheriff to execute on Paiute's redemption
right. A public sale of the redemption right was set for
January 5, 1988.
On December 31, 1987, Paiute assigned its redemption right
to Wind River Resources Corporation. On January 1, 1988, the
final day of the redemption period, Wind River exercised the
right of redemption by delivering to the sheriff's office of
Duchesne County 1) an inadequately notarized copy of the
assignment of Paiute's right of redemption; 2) an acknowledged
notice of redemption setting forth the calculation of the
redemption amount, the property to be redeemed, and the basis
for its right to redeem; and 3) a cashier's check in the amount
of $4,310. The sheriff issued a sheriff's redemption
certificate to Wind River.
On January 5 and 6, Tech-Fluid attempted
the scheduled execution sale and purchase the
right. However, the sheriff would not accept
until the district court determined whether a
could be subject to execution.

to proceed with
redemption
Tech-Fluid's bid
redemption right

On January 8, Tech-Fluid obtained an order directing the
sheriff to show cause why he should not issue his deed to
Tech-Fluid because of an invalid redemption by Wind River. The
district court subsequently held a hearing on the order to show
cause and ruled that 1) the assignment was valid, 2) the right
of redemption could not be executed upon, 3) Wind River was
entitled to redemption because it substantially complied with
the statutory requirements for redemption, and 4) Tech-Fluid
had no further interest in the well. Tech-Fluid filed a
further motion, claiming that Wind River was required to pay
not only the $4,000 but the entire amount of the lien. The
motion was denied and the court signed its conclusions of law
and order. Tech-Fluid brought this appeal.
On appeal, Tech-Fluid raises several arguments. First, it
argues that, although the trustee abandoned the well, she did
not abandon the right to redeem the well in the event of
foreclosure. If this were true, the assignment from Paiute to
Wind River would be invalid because Paiute would have had no
interest in the redemption right, which would have been held,
until its expiration, by the trustee. Second, Tech-Fluid
argues that the court erred in holding that it could not
execute on the redemption right. Third, it argues that the
redemption was unsuccessful because Wind River failed to
strictly comply with the redemption statute. Finally,
Tech-Fluid argues that Wind River was required to pay the
entire amount of the lien before it could redeem the property.
ABANDONMENT OF THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
Tech-Fluid argues that the trustee never abandoned her
right to redeem the well 2 and therefore Paiute had no right
which it could assign to Wind River. On the other hand,
Gavilan, as successor to Paiute, argues that when the trustee
abandoned her interest in the well, she necessarily abandoned
any right to redeem which might arise in the event of
foreclosure. The trial court heard arguments from counsel at
2. It is noteworthy that the trustee never claimed she had
somehow retained the right to redeem Paiute1s interest in the
well. On the contrary, we are presented with her affidavit
stating she always considered the redemption right abandoned
right along with the well. However, that affidavit was not
submitted to the trial court, is introduced for the first time
on appeal, and, therefore, is not part of the record properly
before us. Accordingly, it plays no part in our decision.

the order to show cause hearing. Subsequent to the hearing,
the parties submitted memoranda to support their positions.
The court ruled that the trustee had abandoned the well long
before the redemption right arose. The evidence and the law
support the district court's conclusion and therefore we affirm.
Tech-Fluid concedes that a right of redemption is a
property interest.3 Moreover/ it is clear that upon the
filing of the bankruptcy proceeding/ the entire "bundle of
rights" Paiute had in the well/ including its right to redeem
in the event of any sale subject to Utah R. Civ. P. 69/ see
note 3/ supra, became part of the bankruptcy estate.4
However/ we do not agree that the trustee had to explicitly
abandon her right of redemption for it to revert to the
debtor,5 any more than she had to explicitly abandon other
rights of ownership/ such as the right to collect royalties or
the right to explore and develop or even the right of
possession.
According to the bankruptcy code# "the court may order the
trustee to abandon any property of the estate that is
burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value
and benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1989). Courts
and commentators have recognized that once abandoned, "the
3. A right of redemption is created in Utah by Rule 69(f) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides, in pertinent
part/ that "[p]roperty sold subject to redemption/ or any part
sold separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or
their successors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor . . . ."
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(1). "Successors in interest" clearly
include assignees. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(2) (2).
4. When a debtor files for bankruptcy, an estate is created
which includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor
in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C.
§ 541 (1979). According to Collier/ "[a]n equity of redemption"
comes within the scope of 'all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property.1" 4 W. Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy
1f 541.07[3] (15th ed. 1989) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1979)).
See also Layton v. Layton, 44 Utah 349# 140 P.2d 759/ 761
(1943).
5. Tech-Fluid relies upon §
states that "property of the
and that is not administered
estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(d)

554(d) of the bankruptcy code which
estate thab is not abandoned . . .
. . . remains property of the
(1989).

property stands as if no bankruptcy had been filed and the
debtor enjoys the same claim to it and interest in it as he
held previous to the filing of bankruptcy." In re Cruseturner,
8 Bankr. 581, 591 (D. Utah 1981) (emphasis added). "Thus,
abandonment constitutes a divestfiturel of all interests in
property that were property of the estate." 4 W. Collier,
Collier on Bankruptcy 1f 554.02[2] (15th ed. 1989) (emphasis
added).
The trial court's conclusion in this case is consistent
with Cruseturner and Collier. We see no reason why the right
to redeem should be treated differently than any other property
interest that the trustee has in the property prior to
abandonment. On the contrary, it would be anomalous to view
the right of redemption as an independent property interest
which stayed with the trustee when she abandoned the property
to which it pertained. The right to redeem is such that it can
only be exercised after property has been sold at a foreclosure
sale, and only those with an interest in the property at the
time of the sale (or their successors in interest) have a right
to redeem. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(1). See also Layton v.
Thayne, 133 F.2d 287, 289 (10th Cir. 1943), cert, denied, 323
U.S. 786 (1944). It is inconsistent to suggest that a trustee,
having abandoned property and consequently being divested of
all interest therein, would still retain a right to redeem, at
least absent some expressed and unambiguous intent by the
trustee to retain that right.6 We hold, therefore, that
"divestiture of all interests in the property" includes
divestiture of the trustee's right to redeem.
Tech-Fluid points to no compelling authority inconsistent
with the trial court's and our conclusion. On the other hand,
although our attention has been drawn to no case deciding the
precise issue before us, the Fourth Circuit has at least stated
in dicta that when the trustee abandons her interest in
property of the estate, "the property and the right of
redemption remains in, or reverts to, the bankrupt." In re
Webb, 54 F.2d 1065, 1067 (4th Cir. 1932).
6. We need not decide whether the trustee could have
specifically retained the right to redeem the property even
while abandoning the property. The trustee in this case chose
not to attempt to retain that right, see note 2, supra, and in
the absence of any indication to that effect, the right to
redeem automatically passed to Paiute upon abandonment of the
well.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the redemption
right belonged to Paiute after the well was abandoned, and that
Paiute could properly assign that right to Wind River,
COMPLIANCE WITH REDEMPTION STATUTE
The district court concluded that Wind River had only to
comply substantially, rather than strictly, with the
requirements of Rule 69(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court also concluded that Wind River had
substantially complied with those requirements. We agree on
both scores.
Rule 69(f)(2) provides that, at the time of redemption,
the redemptioner must produce to the officer or
person from whom he seeks to redeem, and serve
with his notice to the officer: (1) a certified
copy of the docket of the judgment under which
he claims the right to redeem, or, if he redeems
upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of
the record thereof certified by the recorder;
(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged or
proved where the same is necessary to establish
his claim; (3) an affidavit by himself or his
agent showing the amount then actually due on
the lien.
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(2).
Tech-Fluid argues that the trial court erred when it
applied a substantial compliance test to determine whether Wind
River had properly redeemed. Tech-Fluid cites Mollerup v.
Storage Sys. Int'l, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), and argues that
strict compliance with the statutory requirements was
necessary. In Mollerup, the Utah Supreme Court stated that
H
[t]he right of redemption has long been recognized as a
substantive right to be exercised in strict accord with
statutory terms." Xfi. at 1124.
Gavilan, on the other hand, argues that substantial
compliance with the requirements of Rule 69(f)(2) was sufficient
under United States v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976). In
Loosley, the Court stated that
statutes dealing with redemption are
regarded as remedial in character and

should be given liberal construction and
application to permit a property owner who
can pay his debts to do so, and thus make
his creditor whole, and save his property.
Therefore, if a debtor, acting in good
faith, has substantially complied with the
procedural requirements of the rule in such
a manner that the lender mortgagee is not
injured or adversely affected, and is
getting what he is entitled to, the law will
not aid in depriving the mortgagor of his
property for mere falling short of exact
compliance with technicalities.
Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
Mollerup and Loosley, though seemingly inconsistent, are
readily reconciled. Very simply, not all redemption provisions
are alike. Courts, in evaluating the necessity for strict
compliance in these kinds of cases, focus upon the nature of
the statutory requirements and the likelihood of prejudice. If
failure to adhere to the requirements will affect a substantive
right of one of the parties and possibly prejudice that party,
then courts require strict compliance. On the other hand, if
the requirements are merely procedural and will not prejudice
one of the parties, substantial compliance is sufficient.
The Washington Supreme Court addressed these distinctions
directly in Gesa Fed. Credit Union v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.. 105
Wash. 2d 248, 713 P.2d 728, 731-33 (1986) (en banc). The Gesa
court recognized that the Washington redemption statute
involved Ha number of provisions, some which confer a statutory
right . . . and some of which establish a procedure by which
that right is perfected . . . . fA statute is remedial when it
relates to practice, procedure, or remedies and does not affect
a substantive or vested right."* 713 P.2d at 732 (quoting
Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wash. 2d 170, 685 P.2d 1074, 1081
(1984)). The Gesa court went on to hold that the technical
failure involved in that case was harmless because the failure
did not affect a substantive right and appellant was not
prejudiced. I£. at 732-33. £&£ also Household Fin. Corp. v.
Bacon, 58 Or. App. 267, 648 P.2d 421, 423 (1982) (technical
inconsistencies with statutory requirements did not adversely
affect rights of purchaser).
Our Supreme Court in Mollerup was construing Rule 69(f)(3)
which sets a time limit of six months in which redemption must

be made. This provision clearly affects a substantive right of
the purchaser. All right, title and interest in the property do
not vest in the purchaser at a foreclosure sale until the
redemption period has expired. Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist,
96 Utah 297, 85 P.2d 770, 772 (1938). "[T]he interest of the
purchaser is [merely] an equitable interest, subject to be lost
or cancelled or taken away by the debtor or any redemptioner or
their assigns upon payment of the sale price with interest.H 85
P.2d at 772. If there is no redemption within the prescribed
period, the purchaser is then entitled to a conveyance of the
property. Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(5). To allow redemption beyond
the six-month period inevitably compromises and prejudices the
purchaser's interest. Consequently, the Court concluded that
absent some significant facts to -move the conscience" of the
Court, it would not extend the redemption period. Mollerup, 569
P.2d at 1124.
Loosley, like the case before us, involved Rule 69(f)(2).
A brief recitation of the facts in Loosley is helpful. The
Loosleys failed to pay a government loan. The government then
foreclosed on a property interest of the Loosleys. At a
foreclosure sale, the Griffiths purchased the property
interest. The Loosleys then assigned their right of redemption
to the Hammons, who further assigned the right to Basic
Investment, Inc. One day prior to the six-month redemption
period, Basic served a notice of redemption on the Griffiths'
attorney, accompanied with a check for the correct redemption
amount. They did not serve any of the documents specified in
Rule 69(f)(2). Eight days after the tender, the Griffiths
returned the check and rejected the tender based upon Basic's
failure to comply with Rule 69(f)(2).
The trial court in Loosley concluded that because the
Griffiths had failed to adhere to the requirements of Rule
69(f)(2), their redemption failed. On appeal, the Utah Supreme
Court reversed. It recognized that the failure to comply with
the technical requirements of Rule 69(f)(2) had no adverse
effects on the Griffiths. 551 P.2d at 508. It then held that
since the assignments were proper, the Griffiths had tendered
the correct amount within the prescribed time, and the Loosleys
had failed to object, the redemption was good. Id.
Based upon the authority discussed above, and in particular
Loosley, we affirm that substantial compliance is the proper
test under Rule 69(f)(2). Moreover, because the Court found
substantial compliance in Loosley, we are obliged to find it in
this case. Tech-Fluid's position is even weaker than the

Griffiths' position was in Loosley. Wind River not only
tendered the correct amount within the redemption period but
also tendered some proof of the assignment between Paiute and
Wind River and a document entitled "Notice of Redemption" giving
additional facts about its entitlement to redeem. Although Wind
River could surely have done more to comply with the
requirements of Rule 69(f)(2),7 it complied more fully than
did the defendants in Loosley. Additionally, as in Loosley,
Tech-Fluid did not challenge the validity of the tender until
several days after the tender and after the redemption period
had run.
The requirements at issue in this case are identical to
those in Loosley. They are procedural in nature and do not
affect any substantive rights of the purchaser.8 Tech-Fluid
has failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the failure to
strictly adhere to the requirements of Rule 69(f)(2).
Consequently, we affirm the district court's holding that Wind
River substantially complied with the redemption provisions and
that such compliance is all that is necessary.
EXECUTION ON REDEMPTION RIGHT
Having concluded that Wind River otherwise properly
redeemed, we now address whether Tech-Fluid could execute upon
Paiute's redemption right. We hold that it could not.
We need not address the more general issue of whether a
judgment creditor could ever execute upon the judgment debtor's
right of redemption because Tech-Fluid failed to obtain a
foreclosure judgment upon which a post-foreclosure sale
7. Wind River could have complied more fully in several
respects. Although there was no judgment docketed. Wind River
could have submitted a copy of the court order directing sale of
the well. Moreover, there are no facts in the record to suggest
an excuse for the inadequate notarization of the assignment.
Finally/ Wind River could surely have submitted an affidavit
stating the alleged amount due on the lien.
8. The procedural rules of 69(f)(2) were likely created for the
benefit and protection of the sheriff/ so that he may be guided
in what to require to make certain that redemption is in order.
See, e.g.f Household Fin. Corp. v. Bacon, 58 Or. App. 267, 648
P.2d 421, 423 (1982).

deficiency judgment could be based and absent such judgment,
there was nothing on which any execution could be premised.
When Tech-Fluid received relief from the automatic stay
regarding the well, it immediately proceeded to obtain an order
from the district court to sell Paiute's interest in the well.
In its haste, Tech-Fluid did not first obtain a foreclosure
judgment determining the correct amount owing.
Under a normal foreclosure scenario,9 the judgment
creditor first obtains a foreclosure judgment determining the
correct amount due and owning. Then, property subject to the
judgment is sold at a foreclosure sale. See Utah R. Civ. P.
69(a)-(e). If the proceeds from the sale are inadequate to pay
the entire amount determined in the foreclosure judgment, w[t]he
clerk must, as a mere ministerial duty, enter a deficiency
judgment against the [debtor]." First Nat'l Bank v. Haymond, 89
Utah 151, 57 P.2d 1401, 1405 (1936). Without an initial
foreclosure judgment, the clerk has no basis upon which to
calculate a deficiency. Thus, the clerk cannot enter a
deficiency judgment and absent such a judgment he or she cannot
properly issue a writ of execution. Consequently, the clerk in
this case improperly issued the writ of execution.
Tech-Fluid should not now be heard to complain. It chose
its own course of action by failing to first obtain a
foreclosure judgment. We hold that Tech-Fluid was not entitled
to execute upon Paiute's redemption right.10

9. The mechanics' lien statute specifically provides that
mechanics' liens are foreclosed in the same manner, and subject
to the same right of redemption, as in the case of mortgages.
See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-15 (1988).
10. Having based our conclusion on Tech-Fluid's failure to
obtain a foreclosure judgment, we do not mean to suggest that
Tech-Fluid would have prevailed had this fact been otherwise.
There is apparently little case law addressing the issue of
whether a mortgage creditor may execute on the redemption right
of the mortgage debtor. However, Gavilan directs our attention
to Johnson v. Zahn, 380 111. 320, 44 N.E.2d 15 (1942). In
Johnson, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a lien did not
attach to the judgment debtor's equity of redemption arising
from the judgment creditor's deficiency judgment. 44 N.E.2d at
19.

AMOUNT OF REDEMPTION
Finally, Tech-Fluid argues that Wind River was obligated to
pay not only the amount of the bid but the entire amount of the
alleged debt. Rule 69(f)(3) provides in pertinent part:
The property may be redeemed from the
purchaser . . . on paying the amount of
his purchase with 6 percent thereon in
addition . . . and, if the purchaser is
also a creditor having a lien prior to
that of the person seeking redemption,
other than the judgment under which said
purchase was made, the amount of such
lien, with interest.
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(3) (emphasis added). Tech-Fluid does not
claim to have had any lien on the well other than the one which
permitted the original foreclosure sale. Under the express
language of the statute, therefore, it was only entitled to the
amount of the purchase bid plus six percent interest. See
Madsen, Equitable Considerations of Mortgage Foreclosure and
Redemption in Utah: A Need for Remedial Legislation, 1976 Utah
L. Rev. 327, 343-44.
Once again, Tech-Fluid is bound by its choices, including
the decision to bid only $4,000 on the well. As the only bidder
at the sale, Tech-Fluid established the value of the well for
redemption purposes and placed itself in the predicament it now
finds itself. See Kries v. Allen Carpet, Inc., 146 Ariz. 348,
706 P.2d 360, 363-64 (1985) (en banc); Johnson v. Zahn, 380 111.
320, 44 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1942). According to Rule 69(f)(3), Wind
River was only obligated to pay what Tech Fluid paid plus the
specified interest.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the rulings of the district court and hold that:
1) The trustee abandoned her right of redemption when she
abandoned the well; 2) Wind River substantially complied with
the technical requirements of Rule 69(f)(2) and therefore
properly redeemed; 3) having failed to obtain a foreclosure
judgment, Tech-Fluid could not execute on the redemption right;

and 4) Wind River was only obligated under Rule 69(f)(3) to
tender^he amounts of the purchase plus interest.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

'ONCUR:

Robert Bullock, Judge

Norman H. Jackson^Judge
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attention the fact that money was not produced
in court, he did waive his right in that regard,
more especially was that true where tender
was by check and money to meet same was at

all times in bank on which drawn. Hirsh v.
Ogden Furn & Carpet Co., 48 Utah 434. 160 P
283 (1916)
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Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental thereto.
(a) Issuance of writ of execution. Process to enforce a judgment shall be
by a writ of execution unless the court otherwise directs, which may issue at
any time within eight years after the entry of judgment, (except an execution
may be stayed pursuant to Rule 62) either in the county in which such judgment was rendered, or in any county in which a transcript thereof has been
filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court. Notwithstanding the death of a party after judgment execution thereon may be issued, or
such judgment may be enforced, as follows:
(1) In case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application of
his executor or administrator, or successor in interest.
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the judgment is for
the recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a lien
thereon.
ib) Contents of writ and to whom it may be directed. The writ of execution must be issued in the name of the state of Utah, sealed with the seal of
the court and subscribed by the clerk. It may be issued to the sheriff of any
county in the state (and may be issued at the same time to different counties)
but where it requires the delivery of possession or sale of real property, it
must be issued to the sheriff of the county where the property or some part
thereof is situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of personal
property, it may be issued to a constable. It must intelligibly refer to the
judgment, stating the court, the county where the same is entered or docketed,
the names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for money, the amount
thereof, and the amount actually due thereon. It shall be directed to the
sheriff of the county in which it is to be executed in cases involving real
property, and shall require the officer to proceed in accordance with the terms
of the writ; provided that if such writ is against the property of the judgment
debtor generally it may direct the constable to satisfy the judgment, with
interest, out of the personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient personal
property cannot be found, then the sheriff shall satisfy the judgment, with
interest, out of his real property.
If the judgment requires the sale of property, the writ of execution shall
recite such judgment, or the material parts thereof, and direct the officer to
execute the judgment by making the sale and applying the proceeds in conformity therewith. The judgment creditor may require a certified copy of the
judgment to be served with the execution upon the party against whom the
judgment was rendered, or upon the person or officer required thereby or by
law to obey the same, and obedience thereto may be enforced by the court.
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<c> When writ to be returned. The writ of execution shall be made returnable at any time within two months after its receipt by the officer It bhall be
returned to the court from which it issued, and when it is returned the clerk
must attach it to the record
(d) Service of the writ. Unless the execution otherwise directs, the officer
must execute the writ against the property of the judgment debtor by levying
on a sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient [property], collecting
or selling the choses in action and selling the other property, and paying to
the judgment creditor or his attorney so much of the proceeds as will satisfy
the judgment Any excess in the proceeds over the judgment and accruing
costs must be returned to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directed by
the judgment or order of the court. When there is more property of the judgment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing costs
within view of the officer, he must levy only on such part of the property as
the judgment debtor may indicate, if the property indicated is amply sufficient
to satisfy the judgment and costs
When an officer has begun to serve an execution issued out of any court on
or before the return day of such execution he may complete the service and
return thereof after such return day If he shall have begun to serve an execution, and shall die or be incapable of completing the service and return
thereof, the same may be completed by any other officer who might by law
execute the same if delivered to him, and if the first officer shall not have
made a certificate of his doings, the second officer shall certify whatever he
shall find to have been done by the first, and shall add thereto a certificate of
his own doings in completing the service
(e) Proceedings on sale of property.
(1) Notice. Before the sale of the property on execution notice thereof
must be given as follows (1) in case of perishable property, by posting
written notice of the time and place of sale in three public places of the
precinct or city where the sale is to take place, for such a time as may be
reasonable, considering the character and condition of the property <2) in
case of other personal property, by posting a similar notice in at least
three public places of the precinct or city where the sale is to take place,
for not less than 7 nor more than 14 days, (3) in case of real property, bv
posting a similar notice, particularly describing the property, for 21 days,
on the property to be sold, at the place of sale, and also in at least 3 public
places of the precinct or city where the property to be sold is situated, and
publishing a copy thereof at least 3 times, once a week for 3 successive
weeks immediately preceding the sale, in some newspaper published in
the county, if there is one
(2) Postponement. If at the time appointed for the sale of any real or
personal property on execution the officer shall deem it expedient and for
the interest of all persons concerned to postpone the sale for want of
purchasers, or other sufficient cause, he may postpone the same from time
to time, until the same shall be completed, and in every such case he shall
make public declaration thereof at the time and place previously appointed for the sale, and if such postponement is for a longer time than
one day, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original
notice of such sale is required to be given
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property under execution must be
made at auction to the highest bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock a m
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and 5 o'clock p m After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the
execution no more shall be sold Neither the officer holding the execution
nor his deputy shall become a purchaser, or be interested in any purchase
at such sale When the sale is of personal property capable of manual
delivery it must be within view of those who attend the sale, and it must
be sold in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price, and when
the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots or parcels,
they must be sold separately, or when a portion of such real property is
claimed by a third person, and he requires it to be sold separately, such
portion must be thus sold All sales of real property must be made at the
courthouse of the county in which the property, or some part thereof, is
situated The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may also direct the
order in which the property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such
property consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles which can
be sold to advantage separately, and the officer must follow such directions
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be deemed an irrevocable offer, and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for
the property struck off to him at a sale under execution, the officer may
again sell the property at any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss is
occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in addition to being liable
on such bid, is guilty of a contempt of court and may be punished accordingly When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of such person
(5) Personal property. When the purchaser of any personal property
pays the purchase money, the officer making the sale shall deliver the
property to the purchaser (if such property is capable of manual delivery)
and shall execute and deliver to him a certificate of sale and payment
Such certificate shall state that all right, title and interest which the
debtor had in and to such property on the day the execution or attachment was levied, and any right, title and interest since acquired, is transferred to the purchaser
(6) Real property. Upon a sale of real property the officer shall give to
the purchaser a certificate of sale, containing (1) a particular description
of the real property sold, (2) the price paid by him for each lot or parcel if
sold separately, (3) the whole price paid, (4) a statement to the effect that
all right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor in and to the
property is conveyed to the purchaser, provided that where such sale is
subject to redemption that fact shall be stated also A duplicate of such
certificate shall be filed for record bv the officer in the office of the recorder of the county The real property sold shall be subject to redemption,
except where the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two-years' unexpired term, in which event said sale is absolute
(0 Redemption from sale.
(1) Who may redeem. Property sold subject to redemption, or any part
sold separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or their successors in interest (1) the judgment debtor, (2) a creditor having a hen by
judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some share or part
thereof, subsequent to that on which the property was sold
(2) Redemption; how made. At the time of redemption the person
seeking the same may make payment of the amount required to the
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person from whom the property is being redeemed, or for him to the
officer who made the sale, or his successor in office. At the same time the
redemptioner must produce to the officer or person from whom he seeks to
redeem, and serve with his notice to the officer: (Da certified copy of the
docket of the judgment under which he claims the right to redeem, or, if
he redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the record
thereof certified by the recorder; (2) an assignment, properly acknowledged or proved where the same is necessary to establish his claim; (3) an
affidavit by himself or his agent showing the amount then actually due on
the lien.
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property may be
redeemed from the purchaser within six months after the sale on paying
the amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon in addition, together
with the amount of any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for
fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the property which the purchaser may have paid
thereon after the purchase, with interest on such amounts, and, if the
purchaser is also a creditor having a lien prior to that of the person
seeking redemption, other than the judgment under which said purchase
was made, the amount of such lien, with interest.
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded
for redemption is reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption
may pay the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the court out of which execution or order authorizing the sale was
issued, and at the same time file with the court a petition setting forth the
item or items demanded to which he objects, together with his grounds of
objection; and thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing a time for
hearing of such objections. A copy of the petition and order fixing time for
hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than two days before the
day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the court shall enter an
order determining the amount required for redemption. In the event an
additional amount to that theretofore paid to the clerk is required, the
person seeking redemption shall pay to the clerk such additional amount
within 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper
certificate of redemption upon being paid the amount required by the
court for redemption.
(4) Subsequent redemptions. If the property is redeemed by a creditor, any other creditor having a right of redemption may, within 60 days
after the last redemption and within six months after the sale, redeem the
property from such last redemptioner in the same manner as provided in
the preceding subdivision, upon paying the sum of such last redemption,
with three percent thereon in addition and the amount of any assessment
or tax, and any reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of any improvements upon the property which
the last redemptioner may have paid thereon, with interest on such
amount, and, in addition, the amount of any lien held by such last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. Written notice of any redemption shall be given to the officer and a duplicate filed with the recorder of
the county. Similar notice shall be given of any taxes or assessments or
any sums for fire insurance, and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair
of any improvements upon the property, paid by the person redeeming, or
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the amount of any hen acquired, other than upon which the redemption
was made. Failure to file such notice shall relieve any subsequent redemptioner of the obligation to pay such taxes, assessments, or other
liens.
(5) Where no redemption is made. If no redemption is made within
six months after the sale, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a
conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever sixty days have elapsed and no
other redemption by a creditor has been made and notice thereof has been
given, the last redemptioner, or his assignee, is entitled to a sheriffs deed
at the expiration of six months after the sale. If the judgment debtor
redeems, he must make the same payments as are required to effect a
redemption by a creditor. If the debtor redeems, the effect of the sale is
terminated and he is restored to his estate. Upon a redemption by the
debtor, the person to whom the payment is made must execute and deliver to him a certificate of redemption, duly acknowledged. Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the office of the county recorder where
the property is situated.
(6) Rents during period of redemption. The purchaser from the
time of sale until a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of his
redemption until another redemption, is entitled to receive from the tenant in possession the rents of the property sold or the value of the use and
occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits have been received by
the judgment creditor or purchaser, or his or their assigns, from the property thus sold preceding such redemption, tfye amounts of such rents and
profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid; and if the
redemptioner or judgment debtor, before the expiration of the time allowed for such redemption, demands in writing of such purchaser or creditor, or his assigns, a written and verified statement of the amounts of
such rents and profits thus received, the period for redemption is extended five days after such sworn statement is given by such purchaser or
his assigns to such redemptioner or debtor. If such purchaser or his assigns shall for a period of one month from and after such demand, fail or
refuse to give such statement, such redemptioner or debtor may, within
sixty days after such demand, bring an action to compel an accounting
and disclosure of such rents and profits, ar^d until fifteen days from and
after the final determination of such action the right of redemption is
extended to such redemptioner or debtor.
(g) Remedies of purchaser.
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time allowed for redemption,
the court may restrain the commission of waste on the property, upon
motion, with or without notice, of the purchaser, or his successor in interest. But it is not waste for the person in possession of the property at the
time of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, during the period allowed for redemption, to continue to use it in the same manner in which it
was previously used, or to use it in the ordinary course of husbandry, or to
make the necessary repairs or buildings thereon or to use wood or timber
on the property therefor, or for the repair of fences, or for fuel for his
family while he occupies the property. After his estate has become absolute, the purchaser or his successor in interest may maintain an action to
recover damages for injury to the property by the tenant in possession
after sale and before possession is delivered under the conveyance.
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<2> Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of property or is
dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom. Where, because of irregularities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or because the property
sold was not subject to execution and sale, or because of the reversal or
discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of property sold on execution, or
his successor in interest, fails to obtain the property or is dispossessed
thereof or evicted therefrom, the court having jurisdiction thereof shall,
on motion of such party and after such notice to the judgment creditor as
the court may prescribe, enter judgment against such judgment creditor
for the price paid by the purchaser, together with interest. In the alternative, if such purchaser or his successor in interest, fails to recover possession of any property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom in
consequence of irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale, or
because the property sold was not subject to execution and sale, the court
having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party and after such
notice to the judgment debtor as the court may prescribe, revive the
original judgment in the name of the petitioner for the amount paid by
such purchaser at the sale, with interest thereon from the time of payment at the same rate that the original judgment bore; and the judgment
so revived shall have the same force and effect as would an original
judgment of the date of the revival.
(h) Contribution and reimbursement; how enforced. When upon an
execution against several persons more than a pro rata part of the judgment is
satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the property of one, or one of them
pays, without a sale, more than his proportion, and the right of contribution
exists, he may compel such contribution from the others; and where a judgment against several is upon an obligation of one or more as security for the
others, and the surety has paid the amount or any part thereof, by sale of
property or otherwise, he may require reimbursement from the principal. The
person entitled to contribution or reimbursement shall, within one month
after payment, or sale of his property in the event there is a sale, file in the
court where the judgment was rendered a notice of such payment and his
claim for contribution or reimbursement. Upon the filing of such notice the
clerk must make an entry thereof in the margin of the docket which shall
have the effect of a judgment against the other judgment debtors to the extent
of their liability for contribution or reimbursement.
fii Payment of judgment by person indebted to judgment debtor. After the issuance of an execution and before its return, any person indebted to
the judgment debtor may pay to the officer the amount of his debt, or so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the execution, and the officer's receipt is
a sufficient discharge for the amount paid.
(j) Where property is claimed by third person. If an officer shall proceed
to levy any execution on any goods or chattels claimed by any person other
than the defendant, or should he be requested by the judgment creditor so to
do, such officer may require the judgment creditor to give an undertaking,
with good and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs and damages that he may
sustain by reason of the detention or sale of such property; and until such
undertaking is given, the officer may refuse to proceed against such property.
(k) Order for appearance of judgment debtor; arrest At any time
when execution may issue on a judgment, the court from which an execution
might issue shall, upon written motion of the judgment creditor, with or
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without notice as the court may determine, issue an order requiring the judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, to appear before the court
or a master at a specified time and place to answer concerning his or its
property. A judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, may be
required to attend outside the county in which he resides, but the court may
make such order as to mileage and expenses as is just. The order may also
restrain the judgment debtor from disposing of any nonexempt property pending the hearing. Upon the hearing such proceedings may be had for the application of the property of the judgment debtor toward the satisfaction of the
judgment as on execution against such property.
In aid of an order requiring the attendance of the judgment debtor, the court
may, upon satisfactory proof by affidavit or otherwise, that there is danger of
the debtor's absconding, order the sheriff to arrest the debtor and bring him
before the court, and may order such judgment debtor to enter into an undertaking with sufficient sureties, that he will attend from time to time before
the court or master, as may be directed during the pendency of the proceedings and until the final determination thereof, and will not in the meantime
dispose of any portion of his property not exempt from execution. In default of
entering into such undertaking, he may b^ committed to jail.
(1) Examination of debtor of judgment debtor. At any time when execution may issue on a judgment, upon proof by affidavit or otherwise to the
satisfaction of the court that any person or corporation has property of such
judgment debtor or is indebted to him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars,
not exempt from execution, the court may order such person or corporation or
any officer or agent thereof, to appear before the court or a master at a specified time and place to answer concerning the same. Witness fees and mileage,
if any, may be awarded by the court.
(m) Order prohibiting transfer of property. If it appears that a person
or corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment debtor or to be indebted to him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt from execution, claims an interest in the property adverse to such judgment debtor or
denies such indebtedness, the court may order such person or corporation to
refrain from transferring or otherwise disposing of such interest or debt until
such time as may reasonably be necessary for the judgment creditor to bring
an action to determine such interest or claim and prosecute the same to judgment. Such order may be modified or vacated by the court at any time upon
such terms as may be just.
(n) Witnesses. Witnesses may be required to appear and testify in any
proceedings brought under Subdivisions (k) and (1) of this rule in the same
manner as upon the trial of an issue.
(o) Order for property to be applied on judgment. The court or master
may order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in
the hands of such debtor, or any other person, or due to the judgment debtor,
to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment.
(p) Appointment of receiver. The court may appoint a receiver of the
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, and may forbid
any transfer or other disposition thereof or interference therewith until its
further order therein; provided that before any receiver shall be vested with
the real property of the judgment debtor a certified copy of his appointment
shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which any real
estate sought to be affected thereby is situated.
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